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In this paper, I construct a general equilibrium model in which the labour
market exhibits search frictions, whereas Cournot competition is assumed in the
goods market. The properties of the long run free-entry equilibrium show that
a more competitive product market raises employment, but it has ambiguous
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11 Introduction
The interactions between product market (de)regulation and labour market perfor-
mance have been the objective of many empirical and theoretical papers in recent
years. Does tougher competition in the goods market increase the level of employment
in the labour market? According to most of the literature, the answer seems to be
a qualiﬁed yes. At a theoretical level, more agents competing in the product market
implies a lower mark-up that can be chosen by each single ﬁrm and a larger aggregate
quantity produced in equilibrium. This in turn raises labour demand, for any given
level of wages. Such a theoretical prediction seems to be conﬁrmed by recent empirical
studies. For instance, according to the OECD (2006), liberalization in goods market is
one decisive factor that helps to explain why some countries (Ireland, Austria, Scan-
dinavia, and the Netherlands) experience high employment rates even if their labour
markets remain very regulated1 .
Less attention, however, has been devoted to the welfare implications of product
marked (de)regulation on the labour market. The objective of this paper is twofold.
First, I analyze the eﬀects of tougher competition in the goods market on employment,
wages and hours worked when the labour market present frictions and eﬃcient bargain-
ing is assumed between workers and ﬁrms. Second, turning to the normative analysis,
I wonder what is the optimal level of competition and employment in such economy.
To perform this task, I construct a general equilibrium model with Cournot com-
petition in the goods sector and matching frictions ` a la Pissarides (2000) in the labour
market. The choice of Cournot competition is made for two reasons. First, diﬀerently
from other papers (for instance Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003 and Ebell and Haefke,
2006), I am considering a framework in which the number of ﬁrms producing in a mar-
ket varies in equilibrium according to a stochastic process, so that any ﬁrm’ strategy
1In this avenue, the most recent analyzes are conducted by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) and
Griﬃth, Harrison, and Macartney (2007), while a detailed survey is in Schiantarelli (2005). Consid-
ering a panel of some OECD countries over the past two decades, Nicoletti and Scarpetta reach two
important conclusions. First, regulations that curb competition and entry have substantially reduced
the employment rates in OECD countries over the past two decades. Second, the negative impact
of such product market rigidities on employment is much costlier, the more regulated is the labour
market. Therefore, product market reforms should induce larger gains in term of employment in
countries whose labour market is more rigid.
2depends not only on the actual level of competition, but also on the probability that
new competitors will enter the market. The properties of the Cournot equilibrium as
the number of players varies are well-known (see Frank, 1965), and it seems therefore
an appropriate choice for this kind of analysis. Second, this paper focuses on the long
run free-entry equilibrium, in which Cournot models are not subject to the critiques
sometimes addressed to other settings (for instance, free-entry in a monopolistic com-
petition set-up is modeled as a change in the elasticity of substitution in the utility
function, a parameter that should remain ﬁxed).
I consider an economy with a ﬁnite and exogenous number of intermediate sectors,
each of them composed by a constant labour force, and only one ﬁnal consumption
good. In the ﬁnal good sector perfect competition is assumed, whereas ﬁrms compete ` a
la Cournot in the intermediate sectors. To produce in the intermediate market, any ﬁrm
needs to ﬁnd a worker by posting a vacancy in the labour market, and then negotiate
with him the wage and the amount of hours worked. Considering hours worked in
ﬁrms’ production function is coherent with the empirical evidence recently emphasized
by Hall (2006). He shows that in the U.S. economy over the past 60 years hours per
worker can account for more than half of cyclical variations in total hours of work.
Keeping the assumption of one ﬁrm-one job present in standard matching models, in
a generic sector the level of employment, and consequently the degree of competition,
can vary between a monopoly, (only one ﬁrm is active and only one worker is employed)
and L (the maximum possible level of competition and full employment). The creation
and the destruction of jobs in each market follow a continuous-time Markov Chain
with a discrete number of states. The probability that one more job is created in
one sector is endogenous and depends on the level of unemployment and the number
of vacancies posted in that sector. In addition, at a certain exogenous rate, a new
intermediate product, replacing an existing one, is invented in the economy and all
the jobs present in the “old” sector are destroyed. A free-entry condition imposes that
ﬁrms post vacancies as long as they earn positive expected proﬁts. At the equilibrium,
the level of competition (i.e. the number of ﬁrms competing), the real wage, and
the amount of hours worked is not the same among the intermediate markets but is
endogenously distributed.
The main contributions of this paper are the following. I show that a reduction in
entry costs or in workers’ bargaining power raises employment, but it has ambiguous
3eﬀects on the average real wage in the economy and on employees’ utility. Previous
papers (see for instance Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003) have concluded that in the long
run lower entry costs in the product market have a positive impact both on employment
and on the real wage, while a reduction in workers’ bargaining power leads to more
employment and leaves real wages unaﬀected2. So, why are the conclusions on the real
wage diﬀerent?
In this paper, two opposite eﬀects are at work on the average real wage. A reduction
in the cost of opening a vacancy, by increasing employment and the total amount of the
ﬁnal consumption good produced, decreases its price and therefore raises real wages
for any given level of competition in the intermediate markets (income eﬀect). Yet,
at the new equilibrium, there is a higher fraction of workers employed in sectors with
ﬁercer competition, where real wages are lower (distribution eﬀect). Blanchard and
Giavazzi consider only symmetric equilibria (in which any intermediate goods has the
same price), and the long-run equilibrium condition requires that proﬁts per worker
are equal to a ﬁxed cost of entry. These two features of their model imply that the
long-run real wage is a decreasing function of the cost of entry only3. Then, a decrease
in this parameter raises both employment and the real wage.
The second contribution of the present paper is a normative one. I show that a
free-entry equilibrium in which workers’ bargaining power is not strong enough, may
deliver an ineﬃciently high level of employment and competition. Under the standard
hypothesis of a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, imposing that the worker’s bar-
gaining power is equal to the elasticity of the matching technology leads to an excess
of employment and competition. In other terms, the Hosios (1990) condition does not
ensure the eﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium. This is quite obvious, for the
present model presents several departures from a standard matching framework: the
law of motion of employment, the bargaining problem, the imperfect competition in
2Spector (2004) gets a diﬀerent result in a context of ﬁxed capital in the production function. The
reduction in workers’ rents may oﬀset the reduction in the consumption good price, so that the ﬁnal
eﬀect on the real wage is negative.
3In a symmetric equilibrium, the relative price (i.e the price of the good produced over the con-
sumption price index) is equal to 1. The real wage is given by the diﬀerence between the relative price
and the proﬁt of the ﬁrm per worker. Hence, in the long run, the real wage is equal to 1 minus the
ﬁxed entry cost.
4the product market.
This result depends on two sources of externalities. Any ﬁrm deciding to enter the
market lowers both the probability for other ﬁrms to ﬁll their vacancy and, by making
the market more competitive, their (expected) proﬁts. These two eﬀects are not taken
into account by the single ﬁrm, so that entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is
to society. To limit the incentives ﬁrms have to enter the market, worker’s bargaining
power must be high enough, so that employees capture a large fraction of the total
rent.
In a similar model, Ebell and Haefke (2006) reach the opposite conclusion: If the
Hosios condition holds, the level of employment is ineﬃciently low. The source of such
conﬂicting results mainly depends on the diﬀerent welfare functions considered. In the
present paper, the social planner’s problem consists in choosing the optimal quantity
produced by the single intermediate ﬁrm, and the optimal number of intermediate ﬁrms
that must compete in each sector. Such results are then compared with the free-entry
long run equilibrium. In Ebell and Haefke’s paper, the social planner has to select the
quantity produced by a single ﬁrm, but not the number of ﬁrms that can be active in
the market. This choice is then compared with the short-run decentralized equilibrium,
where free-entry is not allowed. In such a case, monopolistic competition induces each
ﬁrm to produce less than the optimal level, in order to secure a higher mark-up. So,
ﬁrms hire less workers than in a competitive optimal framework4.
It must be also stressed that such excess of entry result is in line with the conclusion
exposed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) about free
entry and social ineﬃciency. Mankiw and Whinston prove that imperfect competition
models with an homogeneous good and a ﬁxed cost of entry deliver an ineﬃciently high
level of competition, exactly because of the “business stealing” eﬀect explained above.
A numerical simulation is ﬁnally conducted on the basis of Belgian data. The aim
4Actually, in Ebell and Haefke’s framework, there is also a hiring externality - opposite in sign.
Since the wage is proportional to the marginal revenues, that are decreasing in a monopolistic set-up,
ﬁrms will be induced to hire more than the optimal level in order to reduce the wage paid to all the
workers. Such strategic behaviour has been ﬁrst studied by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and extended
to matching models by Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). In their model, Ebell and Haefke show that the
ﬁrst, monopolistic eﬀect prevails and ﬁrms hire less than in a competitive framework, unless workers’
bargaining power is extremely high.
5of such exercise is simply to see how the gap between the laissez faire and the optimal
employment rates can be reduced. A policy aimed at lowering the cost of opening
a vacancy does not better the performance of the decentralized economy. Instead,
increasing workers’ bargaining power allows to bridge the gap between the optimal and
the laissez faire outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium. Section 4 studies the policy implications,
while Section 5 analyzes the welfare problem. Section 6 shows the quantitative results
obtained. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences and technology
I consider an economy with one ﬁnal consumption good and a large number I of
intermediate goods. The ﬁnal good market is perfectly competitive, whereas Cournot
competition is assumed within each intermediate sector. The ﬁnal good production












in which Qi is the amount of intermediate good i used by the production process of the
ﬁnal good and s > 1 to ensure decreasing marginal productivity. Cost minimization in



















P is the price index. Parameter s is the elasticity of the demand for good i.
Time is continuous. In each intermediate sector there are L inﬁnitely-lived and risk-
neutral workers; they can be employed only in that industry, so there are I perfectly
segmented labour markets. Each ﬁrm is made of a (ﬁlled or vacant) job. The I labour
6markets present some unexplained frictions that make the trading process between ﬁrms
and workers not instantaneous. Therefore, to produce and compete in one sector, a
ﬁrm has to post a job vacancy, meet a worker and bargain with him about the wage and
the number of hours worked. The intermediate ﬁrm production function is identical
in each sector and is given by li, where li is the amount of hours worked supplied by
the employee in sector i, and 0 ≤ li ≤ 1. The total amount of good i produced at
time t is equal to Qi,t =
P
j li,j(t)), the subscript j denoting a generic ﬁrm operating
in sector i at time t.
Workers have homogeneous instantaneous utility functions, denoted by vili +φ(li),
with vi being the hourly real wage and φ(li) the disutility of work. For simplicity, I
assume an iso-elastic function φ(li) = z − l ǫ
i /ǫ, ǫ > 1. When unemployed, the worker
enjoys an instantaneous utility z, the value of devoting all your time to leisure.
2.2 The Stochastic Environment
The creation and destruction of jobs in each intermediate market i follows a continuous
time Markov chain that takes values in the set L = {0,1,2,...L}. I assume that in small
interval of time dt at most one ﬁrm can enter in a sector. So, if xi is the number of ﬁrms
active in sector i, the probability that one more ﬁrm enters is given by Mxi dt, while
the probability that more that one ﬁrm enter is equal to zero. The rate Mxi positively
depends on Vxi, the number of job-vacancies, and L − xi the number of unemployed
workers in sector i. So, Mxi = m(Vxi,L − xi), with m(., .) being identical in every
sector, homogeneous of degree one, and increasing in both arguments. Mx is a sort of
black box, capturing the presence of frictions in the labour market.
Moreover, with a probability δ dt a new intermediate product is invented in the
economy, making one existing good obsolete. All the jobs in the “old” intermediate
sector are destroyed and massive layoﬀs occur. To keep the model as simple as possible,
I also assume that all the L workers of the sector destroyed start searching for a job in
the new one. Such hypothesis about a sector-speciﬁc destruction rate wants to be an
(admittedly simpliﬁed) approximation of a product life-cycle. The economy is subject
to a “creative destruction” force that allows the creation of new products but makes
the existing ones obsolete. Indeed, as stressed in many marketing studies, the ﬁnal
stage of a product life-cycle does not not necessarily take the form of a slow decline
7in time5. Sometimes, the rise of new goods (often but not always technologically more
advanced) makes the decline more steady or even transform it in a “collapse”6.
The Markov chain just described can be represented by the following σ-matrix
Σ ≡ (σx,y, x,y ∈ [1,2,...L]):
σx,x+1 = Mx, σx,y = 0, y − x > 1,
σx,x = −(Mx + δ), σx,0 = δ
σ0,1 = M1, σ0,0 = −M1.
(3)
Following Karlin and Tavar´ e (1982) and Van Doorn and Zeifman (2005), I refer to a
process of this type as a birth process with killing, with Mx and δ respectively being
the birth (i.e. the creation of one more job) and the killing (i.e. the destruction of
all the jobs in the sector) rate. Let deﬁne the level of tightness in the labor market
as θxi ≡
Vxi
L−xi. By the constant returns to scale assumption, the rate at which a
single ﬁrm ﬁlls its vacancy when x ﬁrms are already active in market i can be deﬁned
as q(θxi) ≡ Mxi/Vxi and the rate at which a single worker ﬁnds a job is given by
Mxi/(L − xi) = θxiq(θxi). I also deﬁne η ≡
d(1/q(θ))
dθ · θq(θ), the elasticity of the
expected duration of ﬁlling a vacancy with respect to tightness.
Notice that in a text-book Pissarides model, a unique labour market is assumed
and the measure M = m(V,U) represents the number of matches produced at each
moment in the aggregate economy. The law of motion of employment is therefore given
by dE/dt = Mt − Etδ. In this paper, on the contrary, I consider a large number of
small and distinct labour markets and Mxi = m(Vxi,L − xi) represents the rate at
which a new match is created in a generic labour market i. This setting is preferable
to the standard one, since I study the dynamic behaviour of ﬁrms subject to Cournot
competition. Any ﬁrm computing its optimal strategy has to consider both the number
of competitors present in the market and the rate at which new players will enter. Such
a stochastic process, where the number of possible entrants in each intermediate market
5Consider for instance the analysis about “disruptive innovation” pioneered by Christensen (1997).
6In a standard matching model, the destruction rate is job-speciﬁc, meaning that every match
faces a probability of being destroyed. I consider a sector-speciﬁc destruction rate for simplicity. A
job-speciﬁc separation rate would make the asset price equations even more diﬃcult to manage with,
since every ﬁrm would have to consider both the probability that the sector evolves by one unit and
the probability that it decreases by one unit.
8cannot be greater than one in a small interval of time dt, allows to model ﬁrms’ dynamic
decisions, while keeping the model as tractable as possible7.
Intermediate sectors are identical ex-ante, having the same number of workers L,
and the same matching and production technology. So I can remove the subscript i. Let
πx,t be the probability that a time t there are x active ﬁrms in a generic intermediate
market. Then:
πx,t+dt = [1 − δdt − Mxdt] · πx,t + Mx−1dt · πx−1,t ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L],




One can look for a steady-state probability distribution, where πx,t+dt = πx,t, ∀t.
Expressing πx in terms of πx−1 and knowing that
PL
























The probability πx that in one intermediate sector x ﬁrms compete in the market
depends on L, δ and the endogenous rates Mn = (L − n)θnq(θn) ∀n ∈ [0, 1, 2,...x].





x · πx · I. (5)
Of course, the level of unemployment is given by: U =
PL
x=0 (L − x) · πx · I .
7Usually, equilibrium matching models are adopted to study the behaviour of aggregate labour
markets. However, this does not mean in principle that search frictions should be negligible if the
number of potential traders in the market is small. Indeed, the assumption of constant returns to scale
for matching functions implies that the magnitude of frictions (trade costs, asymmetry of information,
geographical distances) in the economy does not depend on the number of people searching for a job
or ﬁrms opening a vacancy.
9Lemma 1 The level of employment E is increasing in Mx, ∀x ∈ [0,1,2,.,L−1].
More in general,
PL
x=0 g(x) · πx · I is increasing (decreasing) in Mx for any function
g(.) increasing (decreasing) in x.
It easy to check that dπx
dMx < 0, dπx
dMn > 0 if n ∈ [0,1,2,....,x − 1], and dπx
dMn = 0 if












The ﬁrst term at the RHS is negative, while the sum is composed by positive terms.
Since
PL




























The last inequality implies that dE
dMx > 0, ∀x ∈ [0,1,..L−1]. It is easy to verify that
the same result applies if x is replaced by an increasing transformation of x. Hence,
PL
x=0 g(x) · πx · I is increasing (decreasing) in Mx for any function g(.) increasing
(decreasing) in x.
2.3 Asset price equations
At each moment, the timing of decisions is by assumption the following:
1. Intermediate ﬁrms enter the market by posting vacancies. This costs a ﬁxed
amount h per unit of time. Jobless workers search for a job.
2. At a certain endogenous rate, a ﬁrm meets a worker and both the wage and the
number of hours worked are bargained over.
103. If an agreement is reached, production occurs in the intermediate-goods sector.
Intermediate ﬁrms compete ` a la Cournot to sell their goods to the ﬁnal sector.
Total surplus is shared between the worker and the ﬁrm.
4. At some endogenous rates Mx, x ∈ [0, 1,...,L − 1], a new competitor enters the
intermediate market. Wages and hours worked are modiﬁed accordingly. At an
exogenous rate δ each intermediate product is replaced by a “new” one. All the
jobs in the “old” sector are destroyed. A worker employed in a sector destroyed
enter unemployment and start searching for a job in the new one.
Let r be the discount rate common to all agents. The expected lifetime income for an
unemployed worker in a sector with x competitors, WU(x) solves the following equation:
rWU(x) = z + θxq(θx)[WE(x + 1) − WU(x)]
+ (L − x − 1)θxq(θx)[WU(x + 1) − WU(x)] + δ [WU(0) − WU(x)],
(6)
with x ∈ [0,1..,L − 1]. Being unemployed when the level of employment is equal to x
is like holding an asset that pays you a dividend of z and at a rate θxq(θx) it can be
transformed into employment (hence, x+1 jobs are active in that market). In addition,
the value of the asset can also change because at a rate (L − x − 1)θxq(θx) some other
unemployed worker can ﬁnd a job. In that case, the value of being unemployed shifts
from WU(x) to WU(x + 1). Finally, at a rate δ that sector can become obsolete in the
economy. All the workers employed there lose their job and start their unemployment
spell in the new sector. The capital gain will be equal to WU(0) − WU(x).
Consider the probability that another worker but you is hired and so employment
increases by one unit. This event is taken into account by every agent, for one more
ﬁrm in the market changes the quantity produced (and so the price) in the Nash
equilibrium of the Cournot game. In a standard matching model, on the contrary,
ﬁrms and workers are price takers in the product market and such price variation is
ignored by the single agent computing his expected lifetime income.
Similarly, the asset price equation for a worker employed in a sector with x com-
petitors is equal to:




+ δ [WU(0) − WE(x)]
+ (L − x)θxq(θx)[WE(x + 1) − WE(x)] ,
(7)
11with x ∈ [1,2,..L].
On the other side of the market, the Bellman equation for a job vacancy is then
given by:
rJV(x) = −h + q(θx)[JE(x + 1) − JV(x)]
+ [Mx − q(θx)][JV(x + 1) − JV(x)] + δ [JV(0) − JV(x)],
(8)
with x ∈ [0,L − 1]. Similarly, the value of an active ﬁrm with x − 1 competitors takes
the following form:
rJE(x) = p(Qx)lx − vxlx + δ [JV(0) − JE(x)]
+ (L − x)θxq(θx)[JE(x + 1) − JE(x)] ,
(9)
with x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. Function p(Qx) is expressed in (2) and represents the real price
of the intermediate good when x ﬁrms are competing in the market. JV(0) is the value
of a vacancy when the sector is destroyed. I deﬁne p′(Qx) ≡ ∂p(Qx)/∂lx.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Bargaining
Firms and workers bargain over wages and hours worked. I assume continuous renego-
tiation, meaning that every employer-employee pair renegotiates the level of the wage
and the numbers of hours worked every time a change in the demand occurs because
a new competitor enters the market8. An axiomatic Nash solution is considered. I
impose that the threat points for workers and ﬁrms in the Nash program are not their
options outside the match (respectively, WU and JV ), but their utilities of remaining
together and producing nothing. I make this choice for two reasons.
First, in this framework with imperfect competition in the goods market, adopting
the values of remaining together without producing as threat points seems a more
8Assuming continuous renegotiation seems more “rational” than imposing that the wage and the
hours worked remain constant whatever the conditions in the goods market. If this was the case,
then, for instance, a worker would receive a really high wage even when the product market is very
competitive only because he was hired when there was a monopoly. In other terms, wages and hours
worked should instantaneously adjust to changes in ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
12convenient and realistic choice9. Instantaneous renegotiation implies that each ﬁrm-
worker pair bargains wages and hours worked every time a new job is formed in that
market. In other words, wages and hours worked are bargained not only by workers
(respectively, ﬁrms) that have justed ended their unemployment (resp. vacancy) spell,
but also by incumbents that have to change their strategy in the Cournot game. It
seems more appropriate, especially for such workers and ﬁrms, to assume that in the
case of failure of an agreement they decide not to leave. One can think for instance
that workers are on strike and nothing is produced.
The second reason is tractability. Assuming, as in a standard Pissarides model,
that the threats points are the outside options does not rule out the existence of an
equilibrium, but makes the model less tractable (details are available on request). I
assume therefore that the threat points for an employee and an employer when the
negotiation fails are respectively given by:
r ¯ WE = z + δ
￿
WU(0) − ¯ WE
￿
(10)
r ¯ JE = −δ
￿ ¯ JE − JV(0)
￿
(11)
If an agreement is not concluded, the worker remains employed, he does not receive
any wage and enjoys an instantaneous utility of z. The ﬁrm does not produce and does
not pay the wage. Still, at a rate δ that sector becomes unproductive.
I deﬁne w ≡ v ·l, the total real wage received by the employee, and solve the Nash
maximization problem with respect to {w,l} instead of {v,l}:
wx, lx = argmax
￿
WE(x) − ¯ WE
￿β ￿
JE(x) − ¯ JE
￿1−β
s.t.
WE(x) > WU(x − 1)
JE(x) > JV(x − 1) withx ∈ [1,2,..L].
(12)
JV(x − 1) represents the expected discounted value of a vacancy when x − 1 ﬁrms
compete in the market. In Appendix A, I show that the solution of (12) coincides with
9This kind of bargaining game has been introduced by Rosen (1997) and Hall and Milgrom (2006).
The arguments they advance in favour of such new setting are convincing: in reality, workers (or
unions) and ﬁrms negotiate without seriously considering either permanent resignations or discharging
employees as an option. A disagreement over wages and hours worked usually implies a delay in the
production, strikes, not massive lay-oﬀs or quits.
13the equilibrium of an extensive form game with workers and ﬁrms alternating each
other in making oﬀers in the limit case in which parties have only one instant to make
their bargain. The constraints imposed in the maximization imply that the worker (the
ﬁrm) always has the possibility to abandon the negotiation and become unemployed
(an idle vacancy) if this choice makes him (it) better oﬀ. I assume, as Rosen (1997)
and Hall and Milgrom (2006) do, that such constraints are not binding: no player has
an incentive to quit the negotiation and this holds for any value of x.
Computing the F.O.C.s yields :
β
￿
JE(x) − ¯ JE
￿
= (1 − β)
￿






WE(x) − ¯ WE
= (1 − β)
p′(Qx)lx + p(Qx)
JE(x) − ¯ JE
,
∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. By using equations (7), (9), (11) and (10), I get the following
equilibrium equations of wages and hours worked :















∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L]. The second line in (14) is obtained by using equation (2). For every
x, equations (13) and (14) deﬁne the equilibrium values of lx and wx. Equation (13) has
a straightforward interpretation. The wage is a weighted average of the total revenues
obtained in the intermediate sector (p(Qx)lx) and the opportunity cost of employment
in terms of hours worked (z − φ(lx) = lǫ
x/ǫ). The weights are given by the bargaining
power of workers and ﬁrms, β and 1 − β. If the worker has no bargaining power, he
receives an instantaneous utility from being employed exactly equal to z. On the other
hand, when β = 1, the ﬁrm has no bargaining power and all the proﬁts earned in the
market accrue to the employee. As we will see, in this limit case, ﬁrms cannot recoup
the cost h and no ﬁrm will post a vacancy.
Equation (14) looks very similar to a standard solution of a x−players Cournot
game. I restrict the attention only to symmetric equilibria, where all ﬁrm-worker pairs
14in each sectort produce exactly the same quantity lx. Each worker-ﬁrm pair maximizes
its surplus, given the optimal strategy of the other players. In equilibrium, the marginal
revenue of a ﬁrm must be equal to the marginal utility of leisure for a worker10. Notice
also that, from a single ﬁrm’s viewpoint, Y is given. This is due to the fact that, since
I is large, a single ﬁrm’s decision has an impact only within each sector but does not
aﬀect the price index P and quantity Y .
3.1.1 Properties of wages and hours worked
I consider now the properties of wages and hours worked as competition increases in
a generic sector, while the rest of the economy is considered as given. In other terms,
there is no income eﬀect, and the ﬁnal good production Y is constant.









In lx/wx space, equation (14) is a vertical line, whereas (13) is a monotonically increas-
ing function (see Figure 1). Moreover, some standard properties of Cournot models are
fulﬁlled: As the number of competitors x increases, the quantity produced by a single
ﬁrm, lx, decreases, whereas the aggregate quantity Qx increases11. So the total wage
decreases as x increases:











People employed in more competitive sectors get lower wages but more leisure time.
If I ignore for simplicity the integer problem, the former eﬀect outweighs the latter:
10Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst line of equation (14) with respect to lx, I obtain:
[p′′(Qx)lx + 2p′(Qx)] − (ǫ − 1)lǫ−2
x .
A suﬃcient condition for this equation to be negative is [p′′(Qx)lx + 2p′(Qx)] < 0. Computing the
derivatives, this implies 1+s
s < 2x, that is always true for any x ≥ 1 and s > 1.
11The necessary assumptions to prove such properties are satisﬁed (demand twice diﬀerentiable and
tending to 0 for Qx suﬃciently large, cost function increasing and twice diﬀerentiable, proﬁt function
strictly concave). For the complete proof, I refer to Frank (1965).
15Figure 1: Equilibrium equations for wage and hours worked
Using (13), the instantaneous utility of an employed worker, w + φ(lx), is decreasing
in x:

















The ﬁrst term inside the braces is negative because Qx is increasing in x; the second
term is also negative since lx decreases in x, while the expression inside the square
brackets is positive by (14).
3.2 Free-entry in vacancy creation
To close the model and ﬁnd the equilibrium values of θx, I introduce a free-entry
condition in vacancy creation. Firms enter one intermediate market as long as the
expected return of posting a vacancy is non negative. This means that:
rJV(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ [0,1,..L − 1] (16)
16The expected discounted value of a job when x+1 agents are active in a market must
be equal to the expected cost of ﬁlling a vacancy:
JE(x + 1) =
h
q(θx)
∀x ∈ [0,1,2,..L − 1] (17)




p(Qx)lx − wx + (L − x)θxh
r + δ + (L − x)θxq(θx)
∀x ∈ [1,2,..L]. (18)
The LHS represents the expected duration of ﬁlling a vacancy when x − 1 ﬁrms are
already active in the market. On the RHS, the expected proﬁt is made of two terms:
proﬁts attained when the ﬁrm has x−1 competitors (that is p(Qx)lx − wx) and all the
proﬁts that can be earned with at least x competitors, weighted by the rate Mx (since
(L − x)θxh = Mx
h
q(θx) = Mx · JE(x + 1)).
The equations in (18) represent a system of L unknown variables, [θ0,θ1,...,θL−1].







Labour market tightness θL−1 does not depend on other values of θ. The endogenous
variables lL and wL are uniquely deﬁned by the F.O.C.s (13) and (14) evaluated at
x = L. I can therefore solve the system in (18) “backward”, starting from θL−1 and
going back to θL−2, θL−3, ..., θ0.
3.2.1 Properties of labour market tightness
I am interested in knowing how the equilibrium value of tightness θx changes with x.
The following lemma summarizes the results:
Lemma 2 θx < θx−1, ∀x ∈ [1,2,..L−1]. Hence, Mx < Mx−1 ∀x ∈ [1,2,..L−1].
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 states that the number of vacancies posted decrease as competition gets
tougher. This makes sense, since a more competitive product market squeezes ﬁrms’
17proﬁts, dampening the incentives in vacancy creation. Such negative eﬀect on the
supply side of the labour market outweighs the reduction in the number of unemployed
workers as x goes up, so that θx ≡ Vx/(L−x) is decreasing in x. Equation (16) implies
that expected discounted proﬁts are equal to zero for any given level of competition
in the goods market. A trade-oﬀ arises: in less competitive markets ﬁrms can attain
higher revenues but stand in a longer queue to ﬁll their vacancies.
3.3 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A long-run general equilibrium is deﬁned as a vector [lx, wx, θx−1, Px ]
∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L], a probability distribution [π0,π1,π2,...,πL], and a value Y of the ﬁnal
good satisfying:
1. the F.O.C.s (13) and (14) of the bargaining problem, ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L].
2. The zero proﬁt condition (18), ∀x ∈ [1,2,...,L].
3. The steady-state distribution (4).
4. The conditions in the ﬁnal good sector (1) and (2).
The F.O.C.s (13), (14), and the demand function (2) determine the values of wx and
lx as a function of Y ∀x. Then, substituting the equilibrium values of wx and lx in
the system (18), I can express the elements of the vector [θ0, θ1,...,θL−1] in terms of
Y . In turn, using (4), I also determine the probabilities [π0, π1,...,πL] as a function of






























It is easy to see that this equilibrium has two solutions for Y , one equal to zero and the
other positive. As Y = 0, nothing is produced in the intermediate sectors, all workers
are unemployed and the probability distribution collapses to a mass point x = 0.
Henceforth, I will concentrate on the positive equilibrium.
184 Competition in Products and Labour Markets
I now assess the impact on average employment, real wage and workers’ utility of a
change in β and h in every sector of the economy. To simplify the analysis, I assume
henceforth a Cobb-Douglas matching function, Mx = a(L − x)η · V 1−η
x , with η = 0.5,
in line with the ﬁndings of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
4.1 Eﬀects on Employment
The results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 A decrease in workers’ bargaining power β or in the cost of opening
a vacancy h raises the aggregate level of employment, E.
Proof.
In Appendix C, I show that θx is decreasing in β and h, ∀x ∈ [0,1,...L−1]. Hence, a
lower β or h raises θx and, in turn, Mx = (L−x)θxq(θx). From Lemma 1, the average
level of employment, E, goes up.
A lower bargaining power for workers reduces the wage and raises ﬁrms’ expected
proﬁts. So, more competitors will enter the labour market by posting a vacancy. This
in turn augments the employment. A similar eﬀect occurs by lowering the cost of
opening a vacancy h. Proposition 1 is in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Nicoletti
and Scarpetta and Griﬃth, Harrison, and Macartney (2007), and with the theoretical
conclusions obtained by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Ebell and Haefke (2006).
4.2 Eﬀects on the real wage and on workers’ utility
A decrease in the cost of opening a vacancy.
From Proposition 1, a decrease in h augments Mx ∀x. Mx raises the ﬁnal good Y and,
in turn, this has an impact on the real wage and the hours worked. To analyze the






















Recall that the intermediate quantity Qx is increasing in x. Then, from Lemma 1,
a higher Mx raises the amount of the ﬁnal good, Y . From (2), a higher Y enhances
p(Qx). In turn, this has a positive impact on hours worked: the RHS of the F.O.C. (14)










β (p(Qx) + p





























Such derivative is positive because p(Qx) and lx are increasing in x, while the term
inside the square brackets is zero for the F.O.C. (14). So, reducing the cost of opening
a vacancy raises both the real wage and worker’s instantaneous utility for any given
level of competition x.







Two opposite eﬀects are at work. On one hand, a higher Y raises ¯ w, because wx is
increasing in Y for any x. On the other hand, Lemma 1 cannot be used to assess
the impact of a higher Mx on ¯ w, because we do not know if wx · x is an increasing or
decreasing function of x. Since a reduction in the vacancy cost raises both Mx and Y ,
the ﬁnal eﬀect on the average real wage cannot be signed. In other terms, a lower h
enhances the real wage for any given level of competition x, but, by raising tightness,
it also changes the distribution [π0,π1,π2,....,πL]. It may be possible that at the new
equilibrium, in which the average level of employment is higher, workers are more likely
to be in sectors with ﬁercer competition, where the real wages are lower. The former,
income, eﬀect pushes ¯ w up, whereas the latter, distribution, eﬀect lowers it. Of course,
the same reasoning applies to the average workers’ utility.
20A decrease in workers’ bargaining power.
It is easy to verify that a reduction in workers’ bargaining power β also augments the
ﬁnal good produced Y and hours worked lx, for any given x. However, the eﬀect on the
real wage wx is now ambiguous. The reason is that wx is positively aﬀected by Y and
lx, as in the case of a reduction in h, but it is also decreasing in β. A lower bargaining
power for the workers implies a smaller fraction of the surplus originated by the match

















The ﬁrst term is positive, while the second one is negative, for a higher β lowers Mx.
As consumers, workers beneﬁt of the decrease in β, since a larger amount of the ﬁnal
is produced and consumed. Yet, the employees receive a lower fraction of the surplus.
The ﬁnal eﬀect of β on wx cannot be signed. A fortiori, I cannot assess the impact of
a reduction in workers’ bargaining power on the average real wage.
Diﬀerently from Proposition 1, the conclusions of this sub-section contrast with
those obtained by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)12. The reason of these competing
results is twofold: the (a)symmetry of the long-run equilibrium, and the diﬀerent zero-
proﬁts conditions imposed. Blanchard and Giavazzi focus on a symmetric equilibrium,
in which all the intermediate ﬁrms set the same price. So, the relative price p(Qi) is
equal to 1. Further, in the free-entry equilibrium, proﬁts per worker (i.e. p(Q) − w)
are equal to a ﬁxed cost of entry. It is then clear that the real wage w increases as the
ﬁxed cost decreases, whereas it is unaﬀected by changes in β. In the present paper, on
the contrary, the equilibrium is asymmetric (in the sense that the quantity and price
is not the same among the intermediate sectors), and the real wage in the long-run is
still a function of β.
5 Optimality
In the decentralized economy, there are two departures from the competitive framework,
namely frictions in the labour market and imperfect competition in the goods market.
12Ebell and Haefke (2006) do not analyse the long-run eﬀect of competition on the real wages.
21Finding the optimal level of product market competition and the optimal employment
level and comparing both with the laissez faire outcomes is not therefore an obvious
task. I consider a centralized economy in which a social planner has to choose the opti-
mal number of vacancies and hours worked in any sector. Notice that the interactions
between intermediate sectors come only from the ﬁnal good production function. By the
constant returns to scale assumption, the latter can be written as Y =
PI
i=1 p(Qi)Qi.










dli Qj. Hence, any ef-
fect arising between intermediate sectors (the RHS of the equation above) disappears
and I can study the social planner problem focusing only on what happens within a
generic intermediate sector.
Following Shimer (2004), the welfare function can be expressed for any given x in










+ (L − x)z − h(L − x)θx
+ (L − x)aθ
1−η
x [Ωx+1 − Ωx] + δ [Ω0 − Ωx]
s.t. Qx = x · lx. ∀x ∈ [0,1,2,...L]
(20)
When x ﬁrms are active in a generic intermediate sector, the social planner has to
maximize intermediate ﬁrms’ revenues, the utility of leisure of workers, net to the cost
of opening a vacancy. Moreover, at a rate Mx = (L−x)aθ1−η
x the level of employment
increases by one unit, causing a change of the surplus from Ωx to Ωx+1, and at a rate
δ the sector is destroyed and another one is instantaneously created. The constraint
in (20) reminds that, diﬀerently from the laissez faire economy, the social planner
considers ex ante a symmetric solution, in which every ﬁrm uses the same amount of
hours worked. Of course at x = L, the sector is in full employment and the social
planner has only to choose the amount of hours worked. The solutions (θ◦,l◦)s to











The intuition of the above equations is the following. At the social optimum, the
cost of marginal increase in θx, h, must be equal to the marginal gain, given by
22(dθxq(θx)/dθx)[Ωx+1 − Ωx] = (1−η)a(θ◦
x) [Ωx+1 − Ωx]. Moreover, the optimal level
of hours worked l◦
x is such that the increase in production must be equal to the oppor-
tunity cost in terms of leisure.




dlx Qx cancels out with the sum of the derivatives of
the prices in the other sector with respect to lx. Comparing (14) with (22) one obtains
l◦
x > l∗
x ∀x, the superscript ∗ denoting henceforth the decentralized equilibrium values
of the endogenous variables. This inequality holds since l ǫ
x is increasing in l and p(Qx)
is always greater than p(Qx) + p′(Qx)lx. So the level of hours worked in equilibrium
is always ineﬃciently low. Notice also that equation (22) would coincide with the
outcome of a worker-ﬁrm negotiation, were the good market perfectly competitive.
Denote Sx ≡ p(Qx)lx − l ǫ
x/ǫ. Using (21) and (22) and subtracting the optimal
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+ η(L − x − 1)θ
◦
x+1. (23)
A comparison of (23) with the free-entry equilibrium condition (18) delivers the
following result:
Proposition 2 If β ≤ η, in the decentralized equilibrium the aggregate level of
employment is ineﬃciently high ∀x .
Proof. I ﬁrst consider the case in which in the decentralized equilibrium β = η
and I prove that the level of employment is ineﬃciently high. Then, I show that this
results holds a fortiori if β < η. Using the wage equation (13) and imposing η = β,
























I proceed now in three steps. First, I show that, for all x, S∗
x+1 is always larger than
(x+1)S◦
x+1 − xS◦
x. Then I show that θ∗
L−1 > θ◦
L−1. Finally, I prove that θ∗
x > θ◦
x, ∀x.
23STEP 1 : S∗
x+1 > (x + 1) · S◦
x+1 − x · S◦
x, ∀x ∈ [1,2,...L].
For the proof, see Appendix D.
STEP 2 : θ∗
L−1 > θ◦
L−1.





























From Step 1, the RHS in the decentralized equilibrium equation is larger than the RHS
in the welfare equation. Then, looking at the LHS, θ∗
L−1 > θ◦
L−1.
STEP 3 : θ∗
x > θ◦
x ∀x ∈ [0,1,2,....L − 2].
Having shown that θ∗
L−1 > θ◦
L−1 I can proceed backward and consider the case x =
L−2. It is then clear that the RHS in (24) is larger than the RHS in (23), because of
the inequality proved in Step 1 and because η(L−x−1)θ∗
L−1 > η(L−x−1) θ◦
L−1 by





























η + η(L − x) θ
◦
x, ∀x (26)
since the LHS in (26) is larger than the RHS in (24), that in turn is larger than the















− 1 + η ≤ 0.
Such inequality is always veriﬁed, provided that θ∗
x > θ∗
x+1
13. Then, with (26) being
always true, θ∗
x > θ◦
x ∀x ∈ [0,1,2,....L−1]. Finally, from Lemma 1, a higher θx implies
a higher level of employment.
13When θ∗
x = θ∗





x+1, ∀0 < η ≤ 1.
24If β < η, the inequality in STEP 1 holds a fortiori, so the level of employment is also
too high..
Cournot competition leads to an ineﬃciently low level of hours worked, as each
ﬁrm tends to produce a quantity lx smaller than the optimal one in order to keep the
market price higher.
Three features explain why with β ≤ η the optimal level of employment and
competition is lower than laissez faire one: Search frictions in the labour market,
imperfect competition in the product market, and the rent sharing rule ` a la Hall and
Milgrom (2006).
The presence of frictions in the labour market makes search externalities emerge,
as any ﬁrm deciding to post a vacancy fails to consider both the decrease in other
ﬁrm’s vacancy-ﬁlling probability and the increase in workers’ job-ﬁnding probability.
Moreover, any ﬁrm deciding to enter or not the market also fails to consider the reduc-
tion in other ﬁrms’ proﬁts caused by the increase in competition. Thus, if employers’
bargaining power is not low enough, entry is more desirable to the single ﬁrm than
it is to the social planner, that takes the reduction in incumbent ﬁrms’s proﬁts into
account.
On top of that, the rent-sharing rule I imposed also leads to an excessive level of
tightness if worker’s bargaining power is not high enough. Indeed, in Appendix E,
I show that, even if the product market was perfectly competitive, still the level of
employment would be ineﬃciently high with β ≤ η. The reason is the following. In
the bargaining process (12), workers do not use the opportunity cost of employment
rWU as threat point. Thus, the wage equation (13) is not aﬀected by tightness. Ceteris
paribus, ﬁrms post more vacancies than under a standard Pissarides (2000) bargaining
rule in which the fall-back position is WU, since an increase in tightness does not push
the wage up, squeezing ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Hence, there are too few unemployed workers. Since in the laissez faire economy
the extent of substitution of these two inputs depends on workers’ bargaining power,
a strong β is needed to limit vacancy posting.
This excess of entry result is in line with the ﬁndings of Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987). Both papers prove that imperfect com-
petition models in which ﬁrms can enter the market paying a ﬁxed cost deliver an
25ineﬃciently high level of competition. Indeed, this paper can be framed in the same
environment: It assumes an imperfectly competitive good market where ﬁrms can en-
ter only by involving in a costly search in the labour market. What for Mankiw and
Whinston is a ﬁxed cost, in this paper corresponds to the expected cost of ﬁlling a job
vacancy, h/q(θx). Were the labour market perfectly competitive (i.e. a spot market
in which entry has no cost), an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms would enter and produce, en-
suring perfect competition even in the goods market. The social optimum would then
coincide with the decentralized outcome.
Simulation results (presented in the next section) try to quantify the order of mag-
nitude in terms of employment of such excess of entry ineﬃciency.
6 Quantitative Results
6.1 Calibration
I take the month as unit of time. Data refer to the 1997-1998 period where the stocks
were fairly stable in Belgium. To calibrate the model, I make use of various surveys14,
published statistics15, the quantitative results obtained in Cardullo and der Linden
(2007), and results found in the literature. Table 1 presents the results. As in the
previous sections, I assume the following Cobb-Douglas matching function Mx ≡ a(L−
x)ηV η
x . The elasticity η is imposed equal to 0.5, the value mostly adopted in the
literature (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). In Cardullo and der Linden (2007),
the calibrated value for workers’ bargaining power β is 0.5 for the high-skilled sector
and 0.56 for the low-skilled one. I set it equal to 0.5. Making use of the zero proﬁt
condition in vacancy creation, I calibrate the cost of opening a vacancy h so that the
expected duration of unemployment is in line with the ﬁndings of Dejemeppe (2005).16
Parameter a is a scaling factor for h and it is set equal to 0.12, so that the expected
duration of ﬁlling a vacancy is around 3 months. The discount rate is ﬁxed at 0.004
14Simoens, Denys, and Denolf (1998), Denolf, Denys, and Simoens (1999) and Delmotte,
Van Hootegem, and Dejonckheere (2001).
15Published by national and regional PES in Belgium and by Eurostat (2002a) and Eurostat (2002b).
16From her analysis of unemployment dynamics in Belgium, the average unemployment duration in
1992 was equal to 2 years in the South of Belgium and to 1.5 years in the North.
26(5% on an annual basis). The number of workers in each intermediate sector is set
equal to 20 in order to have a suﬃciently large degrees of product competition. The
elasticity of the demand in the intermediate sectors, s, is set equal to 5, in order to have
an average wage in the economy of 1235 Euros (a value in accordance with the results
obtained in Cardullo and der Linden (2007)). I assume that hours worked l are in an
interval between 0 and 2. Workers’ utility of leisure is given by 2ǫ −lǫ. The parameter
ǫ is set equal to 4, so that on average employees devote to market work around 41 %
of their time17. A sensitivity analysis is conducted on these parameters.
In absence of precise estimations about the sector speciﬁc destruction rate δ, a value
of 0.005 is taken.
6.2 Simulation Results
Figures 3 and 4 show that labour market tightness θx is decreasing in x while the
steady-state distribution πx is an increasing function both in the laissez faire economy
and in the centralized one.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3. I ﬁrst evaluate the
impact of a decrease in the cost of opening a vacancy h on the average values of the
following variables: the wage, the rate of employment (e = E/L), the share of hours
worked, and the volume of work, deﬁned as the total number of hours worked in the
economy over their total potential amount, H ≡
PL
x=0 lx πx /L · 2. The ﬁrst column
of Table 2 shows the main result: the employment rate in the free-entry equilibrium
is higher than the optimal one, the diﬀerence being around 11 %. In terms of volume
of work H such discrepancy is much lower, around 4 %. The other columns of Table 2
show the eﬀects of a decrease in the cost of opening a vacancy h. Such a reduction has
almost no impact both on the wage and on the share of time spent working, whereas it
slightly raises the employment rate and the volume of work. The discrepancy between
the optimal and the decentralized employment level remains fairly stable. A reduction
by 20% of the vacancy cost is needed in order to shorten the employment gap only by
1 %. Intervening on the vacancy cost is ineﬀective for the following reason. A lower h
decreases the externality of one more vacancy created, but at the same time induces
17The average wage and the average number of hours worked are deﬁned respectively as: (1/E) ·
PL
x=1 wx xπxI and (1/E) ·
PL
x=1 lx xπxI.
27more ﬁrms to post vacancies. In other terms, the negative externality a single ﬁrm
creates when entering the market has a lower cost for the society, but there are more
ﬁrms that generate such externality in the new equilibrium. The ﬁrst eﬀect tends to
reduce the gap between the optimal and the laissez faire outcomes, the second tends
to widen it.
In Table 3, I consider the eﬀects of a change in workers’ bargaining power. Keeping
the assumption of a matching function elasticity η = 0.5, I wonder for which value of
β the welfare ineﬃciency can be close to 0. Diﬀerently from h, the parameter β does
not appear in the welfare function, since the social planner cares only about the total
surplus and not about its distribution between workers and ﬁrms. So, a higher β, by
squeezing ﬁrms’ proﬁts and making entry less attractive, could (partially) oﬀset the
excess of entry ineﬃciency. Indeed, with β = 0.7, the diﬀerence between optimal and
decentralized volume of work is around 2 %.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis is conducted on some parameters of the model. Tables 4 and 5
list the results. In Table 4, I consider a change in the elasticity of demand s, as well as
in the workers’ utility parameter ǫ. Such variations do not change the main conclusions
of the original model, that is a diﬀerence around 11 percent between the optimal and
the decentralized employment rate and a diﬀerence of 3 percent in terms of total hours
worked .
In Table 5, I consider diﬀerent values for the matching elasticity η. The level of
wages and the amount of hours worked barely change, since these variables are chosen
via the bargaining process and β is kept equal to 0.5. Employment increases with η.
In the present simulation, 0 < θx < 1, for all x. Hence, by equation (18), a higher
η lowers the expected duration of ﬁlling a vacancy (1/q(θx) = a−1 θ η
x) but raises the
factor at which future proﬁts are discounted (θxq(θx) = aθ 1−η
x ). The ﬁrst eﬀect is
stronger: more vacancies are created, raising the employment rate. Keeping workers’
bargaining power equal to 0.5, the employment ineﬃciency gap decreases with η. This
is because even the social planner, when η goes up, selects more vacancies for any given
level of L − x. Such increase is slightly larger than in the laissez faire equilibrium. In
the last row of Table 5, I compute for any η the value of β such that the diﬀerence
between the decentralized and the optimal total numbers of hours worked is less than
281 %. Since the ineﬃcency gap decreases with η, a lower β/η ratio is needed to be close
to the optimum. With η = 0.5, β must be equal to 0.75; with η = 0.7, β must be set
to 0.8, around 14% more.
So, as far as the value of 0.5 can be considered a good proxy of the elasticity in
the matching technology, β should be at least 50 per cent larger of η to set to zero the
ineﬃciency gap.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, the two-way relationship between product market competition and labour
market performance has been studied both from a positive and from a normative view-
point. As far the positive analysis is concerned, it is shown that a lower cost of opening
a vacancy or a reduction in workers’ bargaining power raise aggregate employment, but
has ambiguous eﬀect on the average real wage and on employee’s instantaneous utility.
Turning to the welfare analysis, however, the conclusion reached is that the decen-
tralized economy may lead to an excessive level of employment and competition. A
“business stealing” eﬀect is at work in such framework: Any single ﬁrm deciding to
enter the market fails to consider the reduction both in other ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts
and in their probability of ﬁnding a worker. Simulation results predicts that, in order
to be close to the optimal level of employment, workers’ bargaining power must be
larger than the elasticity η in the matching function. If the latter is imposed to be 0.5,
then β must be around 0.75.
Some caveats must be advanced about the model speciﬁcation. Imposing perfectly
segmented labour markets is undoubtedly a major restriction. Workers are locked in
their sector unless a new product is invented. Allowing workers to search across sectors
would be a more realistic extension. Finally, it would be also interesting to study the
dynamic evolution of the model and not focusing only on the steady state distribution.
All these extensions are left for future research.
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32Appendix A: The bargaining game
The bargaining process I pursue is very close to Hall and Milgrom (2006); their model,
in turn, is an adapted version of Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986). The
maximization problem in (12) can be seen as a limit case of an extensive form bargaining
game of oﬀers and counter-oﬀers. More precisely, consider a bargaining process that
takes place over time and where ﬁrms and workers alternate in making proposals about
the wage and the numbers of hours worked. After a proposal of the counterpart, a player
has three options. He can abandon the bargaining (and so get an utility of either JV
or WU, the outside options of the employer an the employee), disagree and make a
counter-oﬀer, accept the oﬀer. Binmore et al. (1986) show that the subgame perfect
equilibria of two bargaining games beginning with a proposal either by the employer
or the worker are unique. So the value of rejecting an oﬀer and continuing to bargain
is uniquely deﬁned.
When the worker (respectively, the ﬁrm) decides to reject the other player’s oﬀer
and make a counter-proposal, he receives a utility ﬂow equal to z (resp. to zero),
his utility of leisure. I also introduce an hazard rate, s, that the agreement is no
longer convenient. In this case, the ﬁrm-worker pair is broken. Then, the pair starts
a new negotiation. The expected discounted values for an employer and an employee
in the case the production opportunity disappears and x ﬁrms are active, are given
respectively by ¯ WE and ¯ JE (equations (11) and (10)). Consider a negotiation over
the wage 18. The time period separating one oﬀer from the next one is τ. Since the
value of rejecting an oﬀer and continuing to bargain is uniquely deﬁned19, the worker’s
equilibrium strategy is to accept any oﬀer that makes him at least as well-oﬀ than
both continuing the bargaining and abandoning it. There exists, therefore, a lowest
wage w′ that makes the worker indiﬀerent between such options and, symmetrically,
there exists a highest wage w′′ that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent. It is then clear that the
optimal strategy for a worker is to oﬀer always w′′ and for a ﬁrm to oﬀer always w′.




WU(x − 1), zτ + e
−rτ ￿￿
1 − e







JV(x − 1), e
−rτ ￿￿
1 − e




18The case of a negotiation over wages and hours worked is similar.
19For the proof, I refer to Binmore et al. (1986).
33I assume, as Hall and Milgrom (2006), and Rosen (1997), that neither workers nor
ﬁrms have an incentive to abandon the negotiation. In other terms, the constraints in
(12) are never binding . Therefore, the system (27) becomes:
WE(x,w
′) = zτ + e
−rτ ￿
1 − e











In equilibrium, w′ = w′′ = w. So, WE(x,w′) = WE(x,w′′) = WE(x) and JE(x,w′′) =
JE(x,w′) = JE(x). Moreover, letting τ, the period separating one oﬀer from the next,
approach 0, I get:






￿ ¯ JE − ¯ WE
￿
(29)
This equation is very similar to equation (17) in Hall and Milgrom (2006). If I assume
s → +∞, that is the parties have only an instant to make their bargain, the surplus
sharing rule will become:
WE(x) − ¯ WE = JE(x) − ¯ JE. (30)
It coincides with the F.O.C. for wx of the maximization problem in (12) when β = 0.5.20
The threats points for an employer and employee are given respectively by ¯ JE(x) and





x) + δWU(0) + (L − x)θxq(θx)WE(x + 1)









x + δJV(0) + (L − x)θxq(θx)JE(x + 1)















20Assuming a probability β that Nature selects the worker as ﬁrst mover in the game yields the
generalized Nash solution.
34Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
Let denote for simplicity Rx ≡ p(Qx)lx − wx ∀x ∈ [1,2,..L] and recall that Rx is
decreasing in x (ﬁrms’ revenues decrease with competition). Knowing by (19) that
r + δ =
RLq(θL−1)




Rx + h(L − x)θx
RL q(θL−1) + h(L − x)θxq(θx)
.




Rx q(θx) + h(L − x)θxq(θx)
RL q(θL−1) + h(L − x)θxq(θx)
∀x ∈ [1,..L]. (32)
Consider the case x = L − 1. Equation (32) evaluated at x = L − 1 implies that
q(θL−1) > q(θL−2) if and only if RL−1 > RL. This is always the case, since ﬁrms’
revenues Rx decrease with competition.
Now consider the case x = L−2. Again, equation (32) evaluated at x = L−2 implies









r + δ + θL−1q(θL−1)
⇐⇒
(r + δ)RL−1 + h(r + δ)θL−1 < (r + δ)RL−2 + RL−2 θL−1q(θL−1)
Since RL−2 > RL−1, a suﬃcient condition for the last inequality to hold is:












The last inequality is always veriﬁed since Rx is decreasing in x. So q(θL−2) > q(θL−3)
holds.
With x = L−3, by (32), one gets that q(θL−3) > q(θL−4) if and only if RL−3 q(θL−3) >








r + δ + 2θL−2q(θL−2)
⇐⇒
(r + δ)RL−2 + 2h(r + δ)θL−2 < (r + δ)RL−3 + RL−3 2θL−2q(θL−2)
35A suﬃcient condition for the last inequality to hold is:










RL−3 > RL−2. Therefore q(θL−3) > q(θL−4).
The same steps can be undertaken for any other value of x. So, θx < θx−1, ∀x ∈
[1,..L].
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1
- Comparative statics on β
Consider a Cobb-Douglas matching function: Mx = a(L−x)ηV 1−η
x with η = 0.5 and







. Equation (18) then becomes:
θx−1 =
￿
Rx + h(L − x)θx






dβ < 0 ∀x ∈ [1,2,...L], I undertake the following steps:
1. STEP : I show that
dθL−1
dβ < 0.
2. STEP : I show that θL−1 = −(1 − β)(1 − η)
dθL−1
dβ .
3. STEP: I show that
dθL−2
dβ < 0 if θL−1 ≥ −(1 − β)(1 − η)
dθL−1
dβ .
4. STEP: I show that
dθL−3
dβ < 0 if θL−2 ≥ −(1 − β)(1 − η)
dθL−2
dβ and, in turn, a
suﬃcient condition for such inequality is θL−1 ≥ −(1 − β)(1 − η)
dθL−1
dβ .
5. STEP: More in general,
dθx−1
dβ < 0 if θx ≥ −(1 − β)(1 − η)dθx
dβ and, in turn, a
suﬃcient condition for such inequality is θx+1 ≥ −(1 − β)(1 − η)
dθx+1
dβ .
From the last step, moving backward, I get
dθx−1
dβ < 0 ∀x ∈ [1,2,...L].
1 STEP:


















The derivative is negative because dRx
dβ = − Rx
1−β < 0, ∀x ∈ [1,2,...L].
2 STEP:
The equality comes directly by imposing η = 0.5 and using
dRL
dβ = −RL/(1 − β).
3 STEP:



















(r + δ + Mx) −
dMx
dβ
[Rx + h(L − x)θx].
The sign of the derivative is equal to the sign of Γx. In addition:
dMx
dβ











































From Step 1, we know that
dθL−1





374 and 5 STEP:
The procedure underlying Step 3 and Step 4 is the following.
From (35),
dθL−3




dβ < 0. The latter
condition has been proved in the previous step, so only the former has to be shown.
Once proved that
dθL−3
dβ < 0, the only condition needed to verify that
dθL−4
dβ < 0 is
θL−3 ≥ −(1−β)(1−η)
dθL−3
dβ . In turn, once proved that
dθL−4
dβ < 0, to show that θL−5
is decreasing in β, one only needs to prove that θL−4 ≥ −(1 − β)(1 − η)
dθL−4




dβ < 0 if θx ≥ −(1−β)(1−η)dθx
dβ ∀x ∈ [0,1,...L−1]. Comparing (33)
and (34) with η = 0.5, one gets that θx ≥ −(1 − β)(1 − η)dθx
dβ if





(r + δ + Mx+1) = Rx+1 (r + δ + Mx+1),
the inequality (36) can be written in the following way:
− (1 − β)
￿
h(L − x − 1)
dθx+1
dβ
(r + δ + Mx+1) −
dMx+1
dβ
[Rx+1 + h(L − x − 1)θx+1]
￿




dβ < 0 to be veriﬁed, it is suﬃcient to show that (37) holds at x+1 = L−1.
From Step 2, I know that:
−(1 − β)(1 − η)h
dθL−1
dβ
(r + δ + ML−1) ≤ hθL−1(r + δ + ML−1). (38)
So, if the LHS of (37) evaluated at x + 1 = L − 1 is not greater than the LHS of
(38), then inequality (37) is veriﬁed and
dθL−3
dβ < 0. Dividing the LHS of (37) by
(r + δ + ML−1) and doing some algebra yields:
−(r + δ + ML−1)
dθL−1
dβ
h(1 − β)η ≤
dθL−1
dβ
(1 − η)(1 − β)[RL−1 + hθL−1]









38This inequality is always veriﬁed since, from Lemma 2, θx < θx−1, ∀x. Therefore,




dβ < 0. To show that
dθL−4
dβ < 0,
one must undertake the same passages: from Step 3, θL−4 is decreasing in β if θL−3 ≥
−(1 − β)(1 − η)
dθL−3
dβ . In turn, this is equivalent to prove inequality (37) evaluated at
x+1 = L−2. Using the fact that θL−2 ≥ −(1−β)(1−η)
dθL−2
dβ , inequality (37) holds
even at x + 1 = L − 2.
Proceeding backward, we get that dθx
dβ < 0 ∀x ∈ [0,1,2,...L − 1].
- Comparative statics on h
The procedure is the same as in the comparative statics for β. I show that:
1. dθL−1/dh is negative and that θL−1 = h(1 − η) · dθL−1/dh.
2. dθx−1/dh is negative if θx ≥ h(1 − η) · (dθx/dh) that, in turn, holds if θx+1 ≥






























[Rx + h(L − x)θx].
The sign of (39) is equal to the sign of Tx. After some algebra, one gets that Tx < 0 if
θx ≥ −h(1−η)dθx
dh . In turn, by (33) and (39), a suﬃcient condition for such inequality
to hold is:
−h · Tx+1 ≤ [Rx+1 + h(L − x − 1)θx+1] · (r + δ + Mx+1). (40)
So, to show that θL−2 is decreasing in h, I have to show that (40) holds at x+1 = L−1.
Since θL−1 ≥ h(1 − η)
dθL−1





a(L − x − 1)(r + δ + Mx) ≥ −h · Tx+1,
39evaluated at x + 1 = L − 1. After some algebra, such inequality is equivalent to:
h(1−η)(r+δ+Mx+1)+Rx+1(1−η)q(θx+1) ≥ h(r+δ+M)−h(L−x−1)(1−η)θx+1q(θx+1),
evaluated at x + 1 = L − 1. Dividing by 1 − η = 0.5, and simplifying one gets:
Rx+1q(θx+1) ≥ h(r + δ) = RL−1q(θL−1)
Such inequality is always veriﬁed, for the LHS of (32) is greater than one, ∀x. Hence,
θL−2 ≥ −h(1 − η)
dθL−2
dh and θL−3 is decreasing in h. The same steps undertaken for
θL−4, θL−5, ....,θ0.
Appendix D: Details of the proof of Proposition 2
The inequality S∗
x+1 > (x + 1) · S◦
x+1 − x · S◦





























































Consider ﬁrst the term outside the square brackets. Recall from (22) that the optimal
and the decentralized level of hours worked coincide if there is perfect competition.



















It is then suﬃcient to show that the term in (41) inside the square graphs is negative





ǫ is decreasing in


































The term inside the square bracket is equal to zero, while the ﬁrst term is negative
since p(Qx) has a negative slope.
40Appendix E: Decentralized vs. optimal solution in
the case of perfect competition
Consider the same two-tier productive scheme explained in section 2. The only dif-
ference is that in each intermediate sector there is a continuum of workers of measure
L. Perfect competition prevails in each intermediate market. Firms and workers are
price-takers. Thus, in computing their expected lifetime income, WE(x) = WE,
JE(x) = JE, JV(x) = JV, and WU(x) = WU, ∀x. Keeping the same bargaining










The free-entry condition JE = h














The social planner’s problem is the same as in (20), with the only diﬀerence that x,
the level of employment in a given sector, is now a continuous variable. So, Ωx+1 − Ωx













in which l◦ = l∗ for the F.O.C. (22). A comparison between the laissez faire outcome
and the social planner’s one shows that the Hosios condition β = η is not suﬃcient to
decentralize the optimum. If β ≤ η, the equilibrium level of tightness is ineﬃciently
high. The Hosios condition and a tax τ = ηhθ levied on ﬁrms’ proﬁts are needed to
ensure the eﬃciency in the decentralized economy.
21For the existence of a solution, see Shimer (2004).













l (%. average) 41.0
1/θq(θ) (months) 19.5
1/q(θ) (months) 3.4
¯ w (Euro/month) 1235
Table 1. Calibration: Parameters and levels of endogenous variables in steady state.
42Figure 2: Simulation results: Hours Worked l ∈ [0,2].
Figure 3: A comparison of the optimal level of labour market tightness (dotted line)
with the decentralized one (continuous line).
43Figure 4: A comparison of the optimal steady state distribution (dotted line) with the
decentralized one (continuous line).
Variables h = 24000 h = 16000 h = 14000
¯ w (euros per month) 1235 1232 1231
e∗ (per cent) 90.9 92.3 92.6
Share of hours worked 41.0 41.8 41.8
H∗ (per cent) 38.0 38.5 38.7
e∗ − e◦ 11.1 10.6 10.4
H∗ − H◦ 4.3 4.2 4.1
Table 2. Simulation Results. Variation in the cost of opening a vacancy. Superscript ∗
denotes the free-entry equilibrium values, while superscript ◦ the optimal ones.
Variables β = 0.5 β = 0.6 β = 0.7
Employment rate e∗ (per cent) 90.9 88.9 85.9
Volume of work H∗ (per cent) 38.0 37.2 36.0
e∗ − e◦ (per cent) 11.1 9.1 6.0
H∗ − H◦ (per cent) 4.3 3.6 2.3
Table 3. Simulation Results. Variation in workers’ bargaining power β when η = 0.5.
44Parameters Benchmark 1◦ case 2◦ case 3◦ case
ǫ 4 2 4 3
s 5.5 5.5 6.5 4
Variables
e∗ (per cent) 90.9 89.5 89.2 94.2
¯ w (euros per month) 1235 1877 1015 2404
Share of hours worked (per cent) 41 55.7 39.8 53.0
Volume of work H∗ (per cent) 38.0 49.9 35.5 50.0
H∗ − H◦ (per cent) 4.3 5.3 4.2 5.0
e∗ − e◦ (per cent) if β = η = 0.5 11.1 12.4 11.1 10.7
H∗ − H◦ (per cent) if β = 0.7 2.3 3.1 1.9 3.4
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis.
Parameter Benchmark 1◦ case 2◦ case 3◦ case
η 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7
Variables
e∗ (per cent) 90.9 86.8 93.0 94.3
w (euros per month) 1235 1244 1230 1228
Share of hours worked (per cent) 41 41.9 41.8 41.8
Volume of work H∗ (per cent) 38.0 36.4 38.9 30.3
H∗ − H◦ (per cent) 4.3 4.6 3.5 2.6
e∗ − e◦ (per cent) if β = η 11.1 11.7 9.1 6.8
β/η s.t H∗ − H◦ < 1% 1.5 1.62 1.3 1.14
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: change in the matching elasticity η.
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